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The imposition of Bantu Education in the 1950s has often
been portrayed as the destructive action of a Nationalist
government intent, for purely ideological reasons, on uprooting
a successful and largely benevolent mission education system:
in this view the missions were, as Edgar Brookes put it,
"butchered to make an ideologist's holiday.M1 But this approach
to the issue fails to grasp the essential basis of educational
restructuring in the 1950s. The educational policies of the
state during this decade were above all an attempt to respond to
the crisis of reproduction of the labour force, and especially
its urban component, which had developed during the previous
decade. I will suggest in this article that the state was
particularly concerned to provide the necessary conditions of
reproduction for that section of the labour force which was
permanently urbanized and reliant upon a wage. As the urban
population grew, social reproductive mechanisms which had
operated in the 1920s and 1930s began to break down. In the
1940s the combined forces of collapsing homeland agriculture and
expanding secondary industrialization, generated rapid
urbanization. This placed the existing provision for urban
social reproduction under enormous strain. Housing, transport,
and wages were all inadequate to meet the needs of the growing
urbanized working class. Squatter movements, bus boycotts and
trade unionism spread rapidly, as popular initiatives which
contested these arenas. In turn these fueled the emergence of a
higher and more radical level of oppositional political
activity, marked by the emergence of the Mandela - Tambo -
Sobukwe generation of leadership in the ANC. Thus the dominant
classes were faced on the one hand with levels of poverty which
threatened the very physical production of their workforce, and
on the other by new political threats. The National Party's
policies of the 1950s were largely addressed to resolving this
urban reproductive crisis.
Although the gradually ernerging Verwoerdian vision
postulated a future for urban blacks in the homelands, in our
period this was not the Nationalist's practical priority. Urban
conditions had to be stabilized before government would be in
any position to impose Grand Apartheid. This involved on the
one hand the provision of mass housing projects and a
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concomitant reorganization of urban space; and on the other,
campaigns to crush mass opposition. In the early 1960s both of
these aims were to attain decisive, if temporary, success.2
The introduction of Bantu Education has to be understood
in the context of this restructuring of urban reproductive
conditions. I will argue in this paper that the conditions
which prevailed in education during the 1940s constituted a
major obstacle to social stability. The existing, provincially
administered system of black education, in which mission schools
predominated, was not extensive enough to reach the mass of
black urban youth. This was seen by administrators and
educationalists as a crucial reason for the uncontrollability of
this youth, manifested in massive crime levels, and, they
feared, in potential political mobilization. Moreover the urban
workforce was not providing the numbers of workers with the
education required for semi-skilled labour in the expanding
factories. It was largely to provide the reproductive
infrastructure for the solution of these problems of social
control and labour need that Bantu Education policy was
initially directed. The problems faced by the state in the
educational arena were compounded by the internal crumbling of
the existing missionary schools. Far from thriving this
educational system was in fact in a state of near collapse. Not
only was it too poor and too small to cope with popular demand
for education, but it was increasingly riven with internal
divisions between mission authorities, staff, students and black
communities. The situation facing these schools cannot be
understood purely in organizational terms though. It was also a
crisis of hegemony. A powerful missionary educational tradition
which had, through a long historical period, exerted a formative
influence over the rising African educated elite, was for the
first time experiencing substantial challenges from below to its
claims to authority and knowledge. Verwoerd sought through
Bantu Education not only to replace the missions with a more
extensive and economically viable education system, but also to
create a new form of hegemony capable of securing the support of
popular sectors for the education system and the social
relations it embodied. This article will seek to explore in
detail the nature of the social control problems, labour needs
and the institutional crisis in the mission schools which faced
the Nationalist government. It will investigate how government
sought to address these issues, and how Verwoerd, as Minister of
Native Affairs responsible for black education, sought to create
a new hegemonic order in the education sphere.
I will also suggest that conventional accounts of Bantu
Education fail to deal with its astounding success in drawing
black youth into a new education order. That is not to say that
it attained much popular support at a political level. But it
is to say that the facts of the doubling in size of the school
system within ten years (1955-65) and the apparent failure of
campaigns against Bantu Education from several quarters need to
be explained. It was of course largely the coercive power of
the state which enabled it to ram through its educational
changes. But this is not a total explanation: school intake
vastly expanded despite the fact that education was not
compulsory for blacks. I will therefore suggest that Bantu
Education triumphed partly because it met some of the needs of
subordinate classes for educational provision. In general the
increased availability of educational provision was sufficiently
attractive to township parents that it overcame their scruples
about its ideological content and impoverished material
character. Just as the building of vast townships in the 1950s
was not only a defeat of battles by dwellers in inner city slums
to hold on to their localities, but also an attempt to contain
the pressures of mass squatter movements and attendant
discontents, so Bantu Education was not only about the crushing
of ideological diversity in the schools, but also part of an
attempt to contain the potentially explosive needs of urban
youth and the education aspirations of parents.
This argument derives from the view of Poulantzas that the
state should not be understood purely as the instrument of the
dominant classes, but rather as a field of relations within
which struggle and conflict takes place.3 This implies that the
struggles of the subordinate classes should be seen as present
within the state. This is particularly so in relation to issues
of social reproduction. The form of reproductive institutions
is not the simple result of a state actions which create
structures unproblematically functional to capital» but the
outcome of battles between an array of classes and class
fractions.
As Poulantzas later work implies, the establishment of
Bantu Education thus cannot be explained purely by repression or
purely by ideology. Poulantzas argues that in order to attain
popular acquiescence in the existing order, the state has to
provide a 'material substratum' for this state of affairs. In
Poulantzas' view even the most repressive regime needs to secure
itself by adopting material measures which are of * positive'
significance for the popular masses.4 It has to provide
material changes in the social infrastructure in response to the
pressures of the popular classes, even though the state will
often attempt to shape these into a form congruent with dominant
class needs. The success of the state in stabilizing Bantu
Education in the 1960s thus required both the successful use of
force against popular movements and a struggle (only
fragmentarily successful) to impose a new educational ideology.
But it was underpinned by the establishment of a new school
system which provided a decisive material element in
consolidating popular acquiescence. This also implies a
re-consideration of the educational campaigns against Bantu
Education. They failed to gain their professed objectives. But
they also increased the pressure on the state to attempt to
contain educational aspirations through further school
provision. All of this is not to minimise the drastically
racist, discriminatory, and materially impoverished character of
Bantu Education; it is merely to state that it represented the
outcome of a struggle over educational restructuring in which
the popular classes were not passive bystanders. That outcome
was a defeat for democratic forces: but the battle had only
taken place because the activity of workers and the urban poor
had made education and the situation of youth an important
terrain of conflict for the first time.
The Urban Crisis
Implications
of the 1940s & 1950s and its Educational
By the late 1940s and early 1950s, the education system
was proving quite incapable of providing schooling for the
growing numbers of urban youth. In 1952 school inspectors
estimated that of African children of school going age on the
Rand, 58,138 were in school while 116,276 were not.5 At this
time the majority of schools were mission institutions with a
limited state subsidy: the state thus lacked the educational
apparatus to deal with a growing urban youth population. This
situation created a sharp awareness, on the part of a wide range
of opinion within the dominant classes, that control over urban
youth was fast eroding. This was understood as constituting a
major danger, firstly insofar as it implied the spread of crime
and socially disruptive behaviour, and secondly insofar as it
constituted a potential political threat. Such concerns were
first highlighted by liberal intellectuals. In his 1946
Presidential address to the South African Institute of Race
Relations, Senator Edgar Brookes called for compulsory education
as a 'preventative against delinquency and crime'.6 He expressed
concern that:
In our towns thousands of children are growing up juvenile
delinquents, and a State which is prepared to maintain a
police force and reformatories is apparently not prepared
to increase the expenditure necessary to keep them off the
streets during their formative years.7
By the end of the Smuts government's tenure of office,
such ideas had penetrated the thinking of significant sectors of
government and administration. In its 1948 report, the
Smuts-appointed De Villiers Commission noted that the Secretary
of Social Welfare favoured compulsory education as a solution to
the 'scolly' problem.8 It also recorded that:
A number of witnesses, including responsible municipal
officials contended. . . that juvenile delinquency amongst
Natives was assuming alarming proportions, especially on
the Rand, and that compelling all Native children of
school age to attend school would reduce the incidence of
delinquency.9
On coming to power the Nationalists faced the same urgent
problems of social control. The 1952 Van Schalkwijk Committee
wrote of:
an appreciable increase in the juvenile population of the
urban areas during the last decade. . . [ who ] fall an easy
prey to the vice of the towns.1°
and opined that:
...absence of compulsory education in towns... results in
greater freedom from supervision of non-European
juveniles.l 1
Such thinking could combine with a fear that the
disaffection of youth would manifest itself politically. The
Afrikaner educationist, and head of Diepkloof reformatory, W.
Kieser, noted in 1952 black youth's resentment of discrimination
and bitterness and envy towards white economic privilege,
attributing this to 'agitation and ideas with a strong
Communistic influence.*12
In a situation where such fears of crime and political
activity were at the forefront of policy makers concerns, the
inability of the existing educational system to reach large
number of youth became a major concern for the Nationalist Party
government. In laying down the blueprint for Bantu Education,
the 1951 Eiselen Commission identified the 'relatively small
proportion* of youth reached by the mission schools as one of
the major problems of the existing educational dispensation.A 3
Thus although the Nationalist Party never fully embraced
compulsory education, the idea that youth were a central focus
of the urban crisis, and that this issue could be addressed by
the introduction of mass schooling was one prevalent in both
United Party and National Party circles. As we shall see, the
thrust of the National Party's urban education policy in the
second half of the 1950s and the early 1960s, was directed to
containing the problem of social control of urban youth in the
way advocated by the supporters or mass schooling in the
previous decade.
That the missions lacked the resources to address their
educational tasks was an important reality that has commonly
been neglected by historians. The 5,000 or so mission schools
which constituted the large majority of schools available to
black students in the mid 1950s,14 were in a disastrous economic
situation. The missions were subsidised by the state only
insofar as teachers salaries were concerned: buildings,
supplies, administration, the salaries of non-teaching employees
and medical services were all costs which had to be borne by the
missions themselves.x 5 War-time inflation had exacerbated the
missions financial problems, and the limited economic means of
black parents placed limits on the missions ability to meet
these problems through fee increases.16 The position of the
missions was
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The luminous educational achievements of a
high schools like St. Peters, should not obscure the fact that
most mission schools were poor primary schools with large drop
out rates.20 The Eiselen Commission was not inaccurate when it
stated of schools in this era that:
...the rate of elimination at an early stage is very
high... the standards of achievement in the schools as
measured by examinations and achievement tests is low.2 x
By the 1940s there was no significant sector of dominant
class opinion which did not favour greater state intervention in
black education. This included the missionaries themselves. At
a 1947 meeting of the heads of missionary schools in Port
Elizabeth, a statement was issued to the effect that the
institutions could not bear their finaneial burden without
greater assistance from the government.22
The coming of Bantu Education was also partly a response
to the strong pressures from industry for an education system
which could meet its need for growing numbers of semi-skilled
machine operators. The industrial growth of the 1940s generated
a vast number of new jobs of this kind in industry, two-thirds
of them filled by blacks, of which 50% were Africans.23 The
UP's De Villiers Commission drew out the
implications of industry1s demands for such labour
educational expansion so that
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The Nationalist government, during the 1950s was to prove
more receptive to such industrial labour needs than their formal
commitment to preventing the establishment of a permanently
urbanized black working class might lead one to expect. Once it
had come to power the Nationalist Party showed a clear
recognition that in the short term it could not attempt to
uproot urban workers: rather the aim was to gain effective
control over the process of reproduction of the urban working
class in order to utilize its labour and control its political
and social life. By the early 1950s government was able to
reassure industry that it was quite willing to support the
introduction of black semi-skilled workers into industry,
providing that this was accompanied by a move of white workers
from unskilled to semi-skilled, and semi-skilled to skilled
posts* The 'floating colour bar' temporarily resolved potential
conflict between industry and government. The unwillingness of
the Nationalists to accept urban artisan level training for
blacks was not an important source of friction between industry
and government: neither the UP nor the industrialists showed a
strong practical interest in training blacks in the trades, even
though a shortage of artisans was beginning to make itself
felt.26 Thus the Nationalists were, during the 1950s, receptive
to industry's main immediate labour need: semi-skilled labour.
As we will see this had its impact on the Nationalists attempt
at resolution of the educational crisis.
A further important feature of the crisis within the
education system was the breakdown of the hegemony which white
mission authorities had exercised over black students and
teachers in the years preceding the Second World War. The
subsequent decade and a half saw growing conflict within the
education system. The mission system was becoming unviable not
just economically but also in terms of its claims to authority
over students and guidance over teachers. The gradualist
integration of the leading missionary ideologies was
unacceptable to a rising generation pulled along by the tides of
social crisis and radical nationalism. As we shall see Bantu
Education was to try to address this collapse of the existing
order's outer ideological ramparts by attempting to construct a
new hegemonic discourse in education.
The change in teachers' relation with the authorities had
varied origins. The economic pressures of Great Depression wage
freezes and war time inflation had led to the emergence of a
militant wages campaign amongst Transvaal teachers in the early
1940s.27 Secondly, the political ferment at Fort Hare
University during the 1940s injected a wave of young radicals
into the teaching profession. The University1s graduates during
the decade included the most important of the rising African
nationalist leaders.28 The lack of professional opportunities
for blacks ensured that a large proportion of this generation
would enter the teaching profession: in 1946 there were nearly
14,000 African teachers as opposed to less than half that number
of other salaried or professional blacks.29
These trends expressed themselves in a number of ways.
There was a tendency for young teachers to become active within
the newly emerging Africanist radicalism: in the Transvaal
especially through the African National Congress Youth League.
Within the Transvaal African Teachers Association (TATA) a new,
radical leadership took control in 1949. A split ensued in
which conservative rural teachers broke away, leaving TATA as a
stronghold of politically aware urban teachers.30 In the Cape
on the other hand, the Cape African Teachers Association (CATA)
in 1948 came under the sway of the smaller black nationalist
current, the Non-European Unity Movement {NEUM ) , and its
affiliate, the All African Convention (ACC ) .3A The new,
activist, leadership of CATA emphasized the need to link
teacher's concerns to those of political liberation:
Our slogan 'Equal Pay for Equal Work' therefore implies
that our struggle is the general political struggle for
the emancipation of the African.3 2
CATA's new approach had remarkable short-term success in
mobilising teacher support: whereas in 1949 it organised only
about one in ten Cape African teachers, by 1952 about half of
all the African teachers in the Province were members.33 It was
hardly surprising that mission authorities found black teachers
increasingly disaffected. The attitude of black teachers at
Lovedale in 1946 was described as one of * passive resistance' by
the Inquiry held there.34 In another comment in 1945,
Lovedale's head, R H W Shepherd noted that:
African teachers» particularly graduates, are claiming
exactly the same treatment and to have the same customs as
Europeans who are their fellow teachers... African
teachers feel that their salaries, as compared with the
European teachers doing the same work are too low and this
leads them to think that there can be little or no claim
on extra services 35
The breakdown of mission hegemony was also reflected in
the school authorities relations with students and parents.
Student discontent manifested itself in the 1940s by frequent
riots over student grievances such as discipline and food.3 6
Between 1945 and 1947 there were at least 20 disturbances in
mission institutions.37 In part this was due to the poor
facilities which the missions were providing as a result of
their financial crisis, and war-time shortages. But it also
represented a growing political distrust of mission authorities.
The inquiry into the 1946 Lovedale riot noted that whereas
before the war the school had been free of disciplinary
problems, now the students identified 'the European staff in the
institution as part of the government machinery.'3S
The slipping of the missionaries grip on the consciousness
of the educated black elite was also apparent well beyond the
walls of their institutions. Brookes noted in his 1946 address
that during the riots:
...large sections of responsible Bantu opinion seems to
have condemned the authorities and the missionary bodies
without condemning the indiscipline and licence...39
An integral part of the crisis in education then was that the
mission authorities were losing their ability to win the respect
of the educated black elite. The crucial role that the missions
had thus played in promoting a relatively gradualist outlook
amongst the black intellegensia and political leadership was
thus falling away. With black political aspirations now going
well beyond the limited horizons of the 1930s, there was a
pressing need on the part of the dominant classes for a new
hegemonic vision. As we shall see, a vital feature of Bantu
Education was to be its attempt to address the breakdown of the
hegemony of missionary educational discourse within the black
intellegensia, and beyond its ranks.
In what ways then, can Bantu Education be considered to
have addressed the crises of urban reproduction and hegemony, in
the educational sphere?
In terms of the ability of the state to provide an
education system capable of exerting control over black youth,
the implementation of Bantu Education was a turning point. Its
inception marked the establishment of a mass education system
embracing the bulk of working class youth. For the first time
the state was able to draw the majority of black urban youth
into its education system, and that system was able to maintain
their attendance for a longer period of time than schools had
before. 1955 marked the first year of the implementation of the
measures provided for in the Bantu Education Act of 1953. In
the decade from 1955 to 1965, the numbers of African students in
school doubled from about 1 million, to about 2 million.4 °
The ruthless reorganisation of the school system also
increased its capacity to 'hold' the students it had: the
primary school drop out rate fell noticeably.41 The 1950s saw
this educational restructuring focused on the urban areas: for
example schools in the urban southern Transvaal grew faster in
the 1957-62 period than those in mainly rural Northern
Transvaal.4 2 Thus the late 1950s marked a dramatic adaptation
in the education system to the task of containing and
controlling urban youth.
The financial burden of this expansion was largely
transferred by the state on to the shoulders of black
communities, thus enabling government to institute educational
reorganisation at a particularly low cost to itself: beyond a
fixed annual state expenditure of R13 million, all monies spent
on black education had to come from black taxation, of which
four-fifths would be devoted to this purpose.43 This policy
took a grim toll of educational standards. There were sharp
declines in per capita expenditure on each pupil (1953 R17.08;
1960 R12.46);44 deteriorating student teacher ratios (1946
42,31:1; 1960 54,7:1)45 and widespread use of teachers to take
two shifts of pupils.46 The state whittled away services such
as school feeding schemes.4 7 These brutal methods did however
have the effect of creating mechanisms that could finance a
school system large enough to draw most of the child population
into primary education for the first time.
The grossly racist and inegalitarian character of the new
system should not obscure that it was the first time that a mass
education system efffectively including the black working class
had been put in place in South Africa. Important parallels can
be drawn between the imposition of Bantu Education and the
establishment of mass school ing in industrialising societies
elsewhere. If one examines the growth of mass schooling in late
19th century Europe and North America for example one sees
noteworthy similarities to the South African situation: there
too schooling was seen by dominant social groups as a response
to the need for social control over working class youth, as a
way of producing appropriately trained labour, and as a means of
political socialisation of youth.4 8 Bantu Education was unique
in the form of its racial ideology; but it was far from unique
in its role in providing an educational structure appropriate to
monopoly industrialisation.
Bantu Education also provided a new kind of articulation
between the reproduction of new forms of skilled labour in
schools, and industry. To say this is not to adopt a
functionalist conception in which capital simply has its labour
needs met by the state. There is almost always, in educational
policy formation, a battle between different dominant class
interests, bureaucratic interests and mass pressures from below,
which all go into deciding the outcomes. However as suggested
earlier, in the 1950s the state was not yet attempting to uproot
the industrial working class (as it was to try to do in the
1960s) and was willing to accommodate industries' immediate need
for urban semi-skilled labour. By semi-skilled labour I mean
that in monopoly industry, automation increasingly eliminates
the split characteristic of small, competitive, early industry
between unskilled hands and artisans. As the skills of the
artisan are increasingly replaced by machinery, the high grade
technician capable of repairing and setting up factory machines
comes into his own. On the other hand the machine operator
emerges as a new kind of labourer: the semi-skilled worker who
requires skills of literacy and numeracy and an internalised
work discipline.49 The generation of such semi-skilled labour
was an important part of the new education system's early aims.
It was widely believed by state officials that four years of
schooling was sufficient to provide basic literacy and some
knowledge of English and Afrikaans, and a basis for further
education.50 Thus these first four years were seen (whether
realistically or not) as capable of providing a level of
education appropriate to semi-skilled work. The initial thrust
of Bantu Education was thus toward the expansion of these first
four years of schooling. J. Dugard, a Regional Director of
Bantu Education writes of this period that:
Our first aim was to promote
possible for as many children as
first four years of school.51
literacy by making it
possible to complete the
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In the urban areas a determined thrust was made toward
furthering this objective: white local authorities were allowed
by the state to finance the whole cost of lower primary schools,
whereas schools catering for higher grades were only to be
established in cities in cases where black communities bore half
the costs.5 2
Bantu Education sought to construct a new hegemony, which
could secure the allegiance of large sections of blacks to the
new educational arrangements and thus to the Verwoerdian social
order. In this sense contemporary Marxist analyses which see
the system as purely about the creation of black labour power at
low levels of skill fall short of the mark.5 3 Verwoerd was a
sufficiently shrewd political actor to understand that he could
not rely exclusively on force to dominate a subject population
with any chance of success. Nor was he sufficiently foolish to
believe that it would be possible to maintain black
subordination while holding the barriers to career advancement
at 'certain forms of labour', The point of Verwoerds rightly
notorious, but widely misinterpreted orations on Black Education
in 1953-54, is precisely that while he intended to impose strict
limits on black educational and career advancement in white
areas, he held out on the other hand a new hegemonic vision to
co-optable sections of blacks on the other.5 4 The homelands
would provide an arena within which black economic and political
advancement would unfold. Verwoerd was essentially proposing
homeland structures as the key part of the 'material substratum'
which would secure black acquiescence. Discussions of Bantu
Education often treat Verwoerd's strictures on black career
advancement as if they were new features of political discourse.
But of course they were not: 'civilized labour' had a long and
broadly based history in white politics. What was new was his
aim toward opening a new structures of black 'advancementJ and
incorporation through the homelands.
This meant a sustained attempt organisationally and
ideologically to reincorporate black communities into the
education system. Important mechanisms which aimed in this
direction were the school boards and committees. Each school
would have a school committee: a proportion of the members were
elected by parents. A group of schools was to be controlled by
school boards, appointee based bodies: however the state allowed
local 'traditional' authorities a role in the appointments.55
Thus Verwoerd's administrative system sought to provide a means
of drawing black parents into participation in the school
system, as well as to provide tractable 'leaders' with a source
of patronage. In practice this system faced severe
disadvantages: its undemocratic structure undermined its
potential following, the ANC and the Unity Movement vigorously
disrupted attempts to set up committees, and the boards
arbitrary behaviour often antagonised teachers.5 6 Nevertheless
the establishment of the boards went forward with a degree of
success for government, especially in the less politically
volatile rural areas: by 1956 4,000 committees and 300 boards
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had been established.57 Certainly, this did not constitute a
particularly effective social base for Bantu Education: but it
did demonstrate that there were substantial social groupings
whom Verwoerd could rally around the new system.
Some of the most notable of these could be found amongst
teachers. A major strategy of the Native Affairs Department was
to encourage the development of conservative teachers
organisations. This was a shrewd move, as the leftward surge of
CATA and TATA in the early 1950s had left many less radical
teachers searching for a home. The emergence of the
Conservative Cape African Teachers Union (CATU) in 1952 and
Transvaal African Teachers Union {TATU) in 1950 appear to have
enjoyed the sponsorship of the authorities and these became the
officially recognised negotiating bodies of the teaching
profession.58 At the founding of CATU, Dr E.G. Schnell of the
Cape Education Department expressed the authorities view that
there was a need for a 'responsible body of African teachers to
advise the Department on Native Education'.5 9 In addition the
new system offered the inducement of new prospects of black
promotion to the inspectorate to which some teachers responded
warmly.6 °
These official attempts met with a mixed response. In the
Cape, CATU remained a fairly small and ineffective organisation
throughout the rest of the decade. In Transvaal, teacher
conservatism was manifested more directly. After the crushing
by the authorities of TATA's vigorous campaigning activity the
level of teacher activism dropped off, and the reunification of
Transvaal teachers in the Transvaal United African Teachers
Association in 195 7 took place under the aegis of a cautious
leadership. Both school board structures and conservative
teachers organisations failed to achieve their hegemonic goals
however. Even black conservatives tended to remain sceptical of
Bantu Education. Yet these initiatives did attract a degree of
support and help the state to counterbalance militant opposition
in education.
If we are not to interpret the coming of Bantu Education
in a functionalist manner, that is as a neat solution to
structural problems imposed by the dominant social classes, we
must consider how popular initiatives in the education arena
shaped outcomes. I will argue that in the absence of the
possibility that oppositional movements could provide a
plausible institutional alternative in the educational sphere,
the Bantu Education system was able to gain a certain popular
acquiescence through its ability to create an expanded level of
material provision in education.
If one observed teacher organisation in the early 1950s,
the level of militancy might have led one to conclude that
teacher movements could be a powerful obstacle to state
educational restructuring • In reality, despite a high level of
activism and dedication on the part of teachers, this proved not
to be the case. The combination of harsh repression by the
educational authorities, and division amongst radical teachers,
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proved fatal to teacher opposition to the new education order.
The Transvaal African Teachers Association, under the leadership
of among others, Eskia Mphahlele and Zeph Mothopeng, did wage a
strong propaganda campaign against the initial proposals of the
Eiselen report in the early 1950s. When the leadership group
was dismissed from their posts at Orlando High School in 1952,
they mobilized a significant student boycott at the school, and
drew wide support from the local community and other teachers.
But the boycott eventually crumbled. A split emerged in TATA as
to whether the organisation should seek to re-unite with TATU.
In this debate the more conservative elements gained the upper
hand, and Transvaal teachers subsided into a political
quiescence that was to last two decades.6 * In the Cape the
radicalization of CATA gave an important impetus to
oppositional activity in education and beyond that sphere. In
the rural areas, the NEUM used its influence amongst teachers to
stir up opposition not only to Bantu Education, but also to
state policies on the restructuring of local government and
agriculture. Meetings convened by chiefs and educational
officials were disrupted. CATA also strongly encouraged
attempts to break up school committees and to boycott school
committee elections. But once the real implementation of Bantu
Education began in 1955, CATA proved unable to resist it
effectively. The NEUM's ideological differences with the ANC
made it impossible for it to co-operate with the ANC' s 195 5
school boycotts. CATA officials and members were the victims of
widespread sackings, which both political activity and
litigation by the association proved powerless to halt. Finally
in 1958, a political division over agrarian policy split the
Unity Movement into two, and this effectively finished CATA as a
coherent political force.62
The most substantial resistance to the Bantu Education Act
came from the ANC. In April 1955 school boycott movements were
launched on the Rand and in the Eastern Cape. The ANC supported
African Education Movement (AEM) organised 'Cultural Clubs' -
effectively, alternative schools for the pupils who were out on
boycott. The AEM provided a rigorous programme of training for
group leaders and produced syllabi and study materials.63
However the initiative faced some strong limiting factors.
Youth were far from being highly politicised in the 1950s: the
African National Congress Youth League struggled without great
success to gain the allegiance of township youth.64
(Paradoxically, it was to be the creation of a mass education
system that eventually gave youth a sufficient sense of common
identity to rebel politically). The campaign had strong
material limitations too: the AEM struggled to provide teachers
and equipment for the 6,000 odd children participating in the
boycott:6 5 but this number, impressive as it was, was a drop in
the ocean compared with the one million students regularly
attending school. The Cultural Clubs were extensively
intimidated by the authorities. Most importantly the ANC itself
was uncertain about the aims of the boycott. Sometimes the
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boycott was presented (realistically) as a short-term protest
including alternative education activities; at other times
(quite unrealistically) as an alternative education system which
would continue until the collapse of the Nationalist
government.66 Through 1956 the impracticality of trying to
sustain the Cultural Clubs indefinitely became apparent and the
ANC called off the boycott. Thus by the latter 1950s, popular
resistance to Bantu Education had been effectively checked.
Controversially though, I want to propose that the defeat
of resistance was not the only reason for the secure
establishment of Bantu Education. The restructuring of
education enabled the schools to draw in vast numbers of new
pupils: the schools of Bantu Education thus provided part of a
'material sub-stratum1i which could secure the acquiescence of
the urban working class in the new social order which was to
prevail from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s. This was
precisely acquiescence and not allegiance: but the absence of
widespread resistance in education from late 1956 to mid 1976
surely cannot be satisfactorily accounted for in terms purely of
coercion or brain washing. The Verwoerdian educational outlook
failed to hegemonize significant urban social forces. But the
material reorganization of the education system in the period
did help to defuse potential opposition.
The urban working class parent desperately needed the
schools: not just for their role in education but also for
their role of taking care of the child. As Z.K. Matthews put it
in explaining the failure of the school boycott, schools kept
pupils 'safe from accidents and juvenile delinquency* while
their parents were at work.6 7 Alternative schools did not have
the material capacity to replace regular schools in this role.
In addition, the tremendous numerical expansion of schooling - a
doubling in student numbers from 1 million in 1955 to 2 million
in 196568 undoubtedly generated some supportive reactions from
parents who had not previously been able to keep their children
in school. While politically conscious people and most teachers
rejected Bantu Education, others welcomed it. A teacher who was
working at the time comments:
Now most of the parents were illiterate, they felt that
now anyone can get education... Those who realised the set
up reacted with more support to the missionary
schools...6 9
The same teacher found that parents often did not grasp the
reasons why teachers were resigning in protest against Bantu
Education. He believes that the expansion of the numbers of
students made a favourable impression upon communities and that
it was only those aware of education issues who grasped the
meaning of the new school system:
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It appeared that the changes meant that you could pursue
any type of education you desired... It is only those who
knew education, and what it must consist of, who knew that
it was a destruction coming in.70
Another teacher comments in similar terms:
It was mainly activists who reacted. Black communities
just didn't know about [the] differences... [between
mission and Bantu education].7 l
The expanded material provision of school ing clearly
underpinned the attitude of those sections of black communities
who were prepared to live with the new system. A veteran
teacher, now in his seventies,
to the educational expansion of
says of his community's response
the late 1950s and early 1960s:
...I think they liked it - because the state built
attractive schools. That's what 1 think - better than the
mission schools. They had in mind that these are good for
us 7 2
The remark of a woman teacher suggests how the Verwoerdian
attempt to mobilise ethnicity in the new education policy met
with a degree of success:
[The community] thought that it was a good thing, that the
use of Bantu language would make it easier to cope.7 3
She also found that initial student reaction against Bantu
Education was not widespread:
I think they didn't know
Education was killing them.7 4
it then, that this Bantu
A fifth Soweto teacher interviewed felt that with the exodus of
politically conscious teachers from 1955, the teaching
profession itself became increasingly reconciled to the new
system:
Most of the teachers are children of Bantu Education. So
I don't know what you think about your mother.75
The power of the schools to attract parents support
despite the social inequalities which they embodied is borne out
by the events surrounding the 1955-56 boycotts. The numbers of
students in schools nationally increased during the schools
boycott by about 85,000.76 Even in the ranks of the ANC itself,
members were suspended in about 25 Cape branches for sending
their children to school.77 Ultimately the question came down
to this: the state could provide expanded capacity for
education and child care, albeit on a grossly inegalitarian and
racist basis.
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Drawing urban youth into a structured education system en
masse; transforming the relations between labour market and
education; pushing forward a new attempt to incorporate the
subordinate classes: the Bantu Education system played a
crucial role in the temporarily successful restructuring
exercise through which the Nationalist government was able to,
create a 'stable' apartheid system from the early 1960s until
the mid 1970s. This whole educational project was however
necessitated by the challenges to authority posed by workers,
urban youth, black teachers and communities in the 1950s. The
'material substratum* of a newly expanded education system,
supplementing political repression and ideological manipulation
had a part in creating the popular acquiescence which marked the
19 60s. But the education system never ceased to embody the
conflicts of a deeply divided society - and these were in the
subsequent decade to erupt with brutal violence.
* * * * *
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